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Allocating indivisible goods is a ubiquitous task in fair division. We study additive welfarist rules, an important class of rules which choose an allocation that maximizes the sum of some function of the agents' utilities. Prior work has…
We adopt a parametric approach to analyze the worst-case degradation in social welfare when the allocation of indivisible goods is constrained to be fair. Specifically, we are concerned with cardinality-constrained allocations, which…
In this work, we propose an axiomatic approach for measuring the performance/welfare of a system consisting of concurrent agents in a resource-driven system. Our approach provides a unifying view on popular system optimality principles,…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
Large scale multiagent systems must rely on distributed decision making, as centralized coordination is either impractical or impossible. Recent works approach this problem under a game theoretic lens, whereby utility functions are assigned…
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an algorithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify natural distributed algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium. This…
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to maximize the Nash Social Welfare. We give constant factor…
In this paper, we consider dynamic multi-agent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation. The MAS operates at a competitive equilibrium to ensure supply and demand are balanced. First, we investigate the MAS over a finite horizon.…
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI) is an equilibrium-based solution concept for fair division of discrete items to agents with combinatorial demands. In theory, it is known that in asymptotically large markets:…
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item…
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
This paper proposes a doubled-sided auction mechanism with price discrimination for social welfare (SW) maximization in the electricity and heating market. In this mechanism, energy service providers (ESPs) submit offers and load…
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…
We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness…