Related papers: Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pri…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…

We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the…

This study constructs a novel analytical general equilibrium model to compare environmental policies in a setting where oligopolistic energy firms engage in third-degree price discrimination across residential consumers and industrial…

A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the…

We consider the problem of allocating multiple indivisible items to a set of networked agents to maximize the social welfare subject to network externalities. Here, the social welfare is given by the sum of agents' utilities and…

We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies…

We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…

This paper studies the static economic optimization problem of a system with a single aggregator and multiple prosumers in a Real-Time Balancing Market (RTBM). The aggregator, as the agent responsible for portfolio balancing, needs to…

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…

We study the allocation of indivisible items that form an undirected graph and investigate the worst-case welfare loss when requiring that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on both egalitarian and utilitarian…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…

We propose a new methodology to compute equilibria for general equilibrium problems on exchange economies with real financial markets, home-production, and retention. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices can be determined by solving a…

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…

For incomplete preference relations that are represented by multiple priors and/or multiple -- possibly multivariate -- utility functions, we define a certainty equivalent as well as the utility buy and sell prices and indifference price…

We study optimal monopoly pricing over consumer networks governed by general nonlinear utilities. In our framework, a consumer's utility is jointly determined by an individualized price and the consumption choices of their peers, propagated…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…

Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…

We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of…

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…