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We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

The paper is concerned with distributed learning and optimization in large-scale settings. The well-known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm has been shown to achieve Nash equilibrium learning in certain classes of multi-agent games. However,…

We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…

Many alignment methods, including reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), rely on the Bradley-Terry reward assumption, which is not always sufficient to capture the full range and complexity of general human preferences. We…

We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each player plays a…

We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a…

This paper investigates the challenge of learning in black-box games, where the underlying utility function is unknown to any of the agents. While there is an extensive body of literature on the theoretical analysis of algorithms for…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

Designing efficient algorithms to compute Nash equilibria poses considerable challenges in Algorithmic Game Theory and Optimization. In this work, we employ integer programming techniques to compute Nash equilibria in Integer Programming…

This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…

We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant $\varepsilon>0$, obtains $\varepsilon T$-swap regret within only $T = \mathsf{polylog}(n)$ rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the…

Reciprocal recommender systems (RRS) in dating, gaming, and talent platforms require mutual acceptance for a match. Logged data, however, over-represents popular profiles due to past exposure policies, creating feedback loops that skew…

We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an…

In this paper, we provide a novel and simple algorithm, Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Updates (CMWU) for regret minimization in general games. CMWU effectively corresponds to the standard MWU algorithm but where all agents, when…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MCCFR) has emerged as a cornerstone algorithm for solving extensive-form games, but its integration with deep neural networks introduces scale-dependent challenges that manifest differently…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…

A long line of works characterizes the sample complexity of regret minimization in sequential decision-making by min-max programs. In the corresponding saddle-point game, the min-player optimizes the sampling distribution against an…

We present a simulation-based approach for solution of mean field games (MFGs), using the framework of empirical game-theoretical analysis (EGTA). Our primary method employs a version of the double oracle, iteratively adding strategies…