Related papers: Truthful Equilibria in Generalized Common Agency M…

Strategic multi-agent systems are fundamentally characterized by decentralization, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Agents operating under limited observations will often need to make decisions based on simplified internal models of the…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

We study a repeated Principal Agent problem between a long lived Principal and Agent pair in a prior free setting. In our setting, the sequence of realized states of nature may be adversarially chosen, the Agent is non-myopic, and the…

Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…

We introduce robust learning equilibrium. The idea of learning equilibrium is that learning algorithms in multi-agent systems should themselves be in equilibrium rather than only lead to equilibrium. That is, learning equilibrium is immune…

The existence of stylized facts in financial data has been documented in many studies. In the past decade the modeling of financial markets by agent-based computational economic market models has become a frequently used modeling approach.…

This paper gives a constructive treatment of McKenzie's theorem on the existence of general equilibria. While the full theorem does not admit a constructive proof, and hence does not admit a computational realisation, we show that if we…

Much work in computer science has adopted competitive analysis as a tool for decision making under uncertainty. In this work we extend competitive analysis to the context of multi-agent systems. Unlike classical competitive analysis where…

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…

We present our approach to the problem of how an agent, within an economic Multi-Agent System, can determine when it should behave strategically (i.e. learn and use models of other agents), and when it should act as a simple price-taker. We…

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…

We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…

A privately-informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy towards a receiver. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the utility functions of…

Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…

We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…