Related papers: Truthful Equilibria in Generalized Common Agency M…
Recent work in the field of multi-agent systems has sought to use techniques and concepts from the field of formal methods to provide rigorous theoretical analysis and guarantees on complex systems where multiple agents strategically…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in an economy with production and a continuum of consumers, each of whose incomplete and price-dependent preferences are defined on commodities they may consider deleterious, bads which…
Deciding whether an agent possesses a model of its surrounding world is a fundamental step toward understanding its capabilities and limitations. In [10], it was shown that, within a particular framework, every almost optimal and general…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
Many economic theory models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness…
We present a model describing the competition between information transmission and decision making in financial markets. The solution of this simple model is recalled, and possible variations discussed. It is shown numerically that despite…
Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…
In this paper we study estimating Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) in the case where the agents (individuals) are strategic or self-interested and they concern about their privacy when reporting data. Compared with the classical setting,…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
Trust evaluation is an important topic in both research and applications in sociable environments. This paper presents a model for trust evaluation between agents by the combination of direct trust, indirect trust through neighbouring links…
We consider the impact of fairness requirements on the social efficiency of truthful mechanisms for trade, focusing on Bayesian bilateral-trade settings. Unlike the full information case in which all gains-from-trade can be realized and…
A prediction model is most useful if it generalizes beyond the development data with external validations, but to what extent should it generalize remains unclear. In practice, prediction models are externally validated using data from very…
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems,including the design of externality resistant…
In this paper, the interplay between a class of nonlinear estimators and strategic sensors is studied in several participatory-sensing scenarios. It is shown that for the class of estimators, if the strategic sensors have access to…
We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We…
This paper develops a theory of competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods based entirely on economic conditions on demand. The key idea is to analyze complementarity and substitutability between bundles of goods, rather than merely…
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation…
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…