Related papers: Truthful Equilibria in Generalized Common Agency M…

In this paper, we study which data can be induced by a correlated equilibrium given a known finite simultaneous move game. We assume that an analyst has access to the frequency of each agent's actions but does not have access to the…

We propose a simple and general framework for nonparametric estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects under fairness constraints. Under standard regularity conditions, we show that the resulting estimators possess the double robustness…

We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…

The application of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to economic modeling reveals a fundamental conflict between the assumptions of equilibrium theory and the emergent behavior of learning agents. While canonical economic models assume atomistic…

We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as…

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? How do they perform compared…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…

The cooperation mechanism of indirect reciprocity has been studied by making multiple variations of its parts. This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund model, focused on agents' attitude; it is called Individualistic…

This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…

Rising inequalities around the globe bring into question our economic systems and the origin of such inequalities. Here we propose a toy agent-based model where each entity is simultaneously producing and consuming indivisible goods. We…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

The existence of a (partial) market equilibrium price is proved in a complete, continuous time finite-agent market setting. The economic agents act as price takers in a fully competitive setting and maximize exponential utility from…

This paper consider a highly general dissemination model that keeps track of the stochastic evolution of the distribution of wealth over a set of agents. There are two types of events: (i) units of wealth externally arrive, and (ii) units…

The recent framework of performative prediction is aimed at capturing settings where predictions influence the target/outcome they want to predict. In this paper, we introduce a natural multi-agent version of this framework, where multiple…

We characterize the conditions under which a multi-time quantum process with a finite temporal resolution can be approximately described by an equilibrium one. By providing a generalization of the notion of equilibration on average, where a…

We study a pure-exchange incomplete-market economy with heterogeneous agents. In each period, the agents choose how much to save (i.e., invest in a risk-free bond), how much to consume, and which bundle of goods to consume while their…

We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside…

Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems, cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral…

In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…