Related papers: Pure Nash Equilibria in Resource Graph Games

We propose a generic strategic network resource sharing game between a set of players representing operators. The players negotiate which sets of players share given resources, serving users with varying sensitivity to interference. We…

Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…

We prove that every finite two-person shortest path game, where the local cost of every move is positive for each player, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure stationary strategies, which can be computed in polynomial time. We also extend…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…

In this paper, we aim to develop distributed continuous-time algorithms over directed graphs to seek the Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game. Motivated by the recent consensus-based designs, we present a distributed algorithm with a…

In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…

This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…

In this paper, we compute $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with convex Lipschitz continuous cost functions. The main approach relies on computing a pure Nash equilibrium for an…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…

We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model…

In this paper we study the problem of exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions of the players alone. We consider sparse linear influence games --- a…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

We study in this paper privacy protection in fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking where a player can only access its own cost function and receive information from its immediate neighbors over a directed communication network. In view…