Network Resource Sharing Games with Instantaneous Reciprocity
Computer Science and Game Theory
2016-05-31 v1 Networking and Internet Architecture
Optimization and Control
Abstract
We propose a generic strategic network resource sharing game between a set of players representing operators. The players negotiate which sets of players share given resources, serving users with varying sensitivity to interference. We prove that the proposed game has a Nash equilibrium, to which a greedily played game converges. Furthermore, simulation results show that, when applied to inter-operator spectrum sharing in small-cell indoor office environment, the convergence is fast and there is a significant performance improvement for the operators when compared to the default resource usage configuration.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1605.09194,
title = {Network Resource Sharing Games with Instantaneous Reciprocity},
author = {Sofonias Hailu and Ragnar Freij-Hollanti and Alexis A. Dowhuszko and Olav Tirkkonen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.09194},
year = {2016}
}