Related papers: Skip to Secure: Securing Cyber-physical Control Lo…
Encrypted dynamic controllers that operate for an unlimited time have been a challenging subject of research. The fundamental difficulty is the accumulation of errors and scaling factors in the internal state during operation.…
Closed-loop control systems employ continuous sensing and actuation to maintain controlled variables within preset bounds and achieve the desired system output. Intentional disturbances in the system, such as in the case of cyberattacks,…
Assured Remote Execution on a device is the ability of suitably authorized parties to construct secure channels with known processes -- i.e. processes executing known code -- running on it. Assured Remote Execution requires a hardware basis…
Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
We describe defense mechanisms designed to detect sophisticated grid attacks involving both physical actions (including load modification) and sensor output alteration, with the latter performed in a sparse manner and also so as to take…
Operational Technology (OT) networks of industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly connected to the public Internet, which has prompted ICSes to implement strong security measures (e.g., authentication and encryption) to protect…
We explore the implementation of hybridly protected quantum operations combining the merits of holonomy, dynamical decoupling approach and dephasing-free feature based on a simple and experimentally achievable spin model. The implementation…
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, and…
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escaped and the control-flow can be redirected to arbitrary…
Recently, cloud control systems have gained increasing attention from the research community as a solution to implement networked cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Such an architecture can reduce deployment and maintenance costs albeit at the…
This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…
Growing code bases of modern applications have led to a steady increase in the number of vulnerabilities. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is one promising mitigation that is more and more widely deployed and prevents numerous exploits. CFI…
Industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) manage critical infrastructures by controlling the processes based on the "physics" data gathered by edge sensor networks. Recent innovations in ubiquitous computing and communication technologies…
In an Industrial Control System (ICS), its complex network of sensors, actuators and controllers have raised security concerns for critical infrastructures and industrial production units. This opinion paper strives to initiate discussion…
Injection of transient faults can be used as a way to attack embedded systems. On embedded processors such as microcontrollers, several studies showed that such a transient fault injection with glitches or electromagnetic pulses could…
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility and physical consequences of cyber attacks against energy management systems (EMS). Within this framework, we have designed a complete simulation platform to emulate realistic EMS operations: it…
We study the problem of defending a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) consisting of interdependent components with heterogeneous sensitivity to investments. In addition to the optimal allocation of limited security resources, we analyze the…
We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…
Computing systems, including real-time embedded systems, are becoming increasingly connected to allow for more advanced and safer operation. Such embedded systems are resource-constrained, such as lower processing capabilities, as compared…