Related papers: Stability in Repeated Matching Markets
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Traditional bulk load flexibility options, such as load shifting and load curtailment, for managing uncertainty in power markets limit the diversity of options and ignore the preferences of the individual loads, thus reducing efficiency and…
High shares of variable renewable energy necessitate substantial energy storage capacity. However, it remains unclear how to design a market that, on the one hand, ensures a stable and sufficient income for storage firms, and, on the other…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
The resident matching algorithm, Gale-Shapley, currently used by SF Match and the National Residency Match Program (NRMP), has been in use for over 50 years without fundamental alteration. The algorithm is a 'stable-marriage' method that…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…