Related papers: Stability in Repeated Matching Markets

This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…

The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…

The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in many settings of interest, agent utility functions themselves vary as a…

Clinical trial matching is a key process in health delivery and discovery. In practice, it is plagued by overwhelming unstructured data and unscalable manual processing. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study on scaling clinical trial…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…

We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…

To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…

This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…

Population dynamics are often subject to random independent changes in the environment. For the two strategy stochastic replicator dynamic, we assume that stochastic changes in the environment replace the payoffs and variance. This is…

We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…

We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…

We combine geometric data analysis and stochastic modeling to describe the collective dynamics of complex systems. As an example we apply this approach to financial data and focus on the non-stationarity of the market correlation structure.…

This work proposes a notion of robust reachability of one set from another set under constant control. This notion is used to construct a control strategy, involving sequential set-to-set reachability, which guarantees robust global…

In light of the growing interest in agent-based market models, we bring together several earlier works in which we considered the topic of self-consistent market modelling. Building upon the binary game structure of Challet and Zhang, we…

Our research is concerned with studying behavioural changes within a dynamic system, i.e. health care, and their effects on the decision-making process. Evolutionary Game theory is applied to investigate the most probable strategy(ies)…

We consider an epidemiological model that includes waning and boosting of immunity. Assuming that repeated exposure to the pathogen fully restores immunity, we derive an SIRS-type model with discrete and distributed delays. First we prove…