Related papers: Stability in Repeated Matching Markets
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…
Motivated by applications to a wide range of assemble-to-order systems, operations scheduling, healthcare systems and collaborative economy applications, we introduce a stochastic matching model on hypergraphs, extending the model in [15]…
We examine dynamic coupling and feedback effects between High Frequency Traders (HFTs) and how they can destabilize markets. We develop a general framework for modelling dynamic interaction based on recurrence relations, and use this to…
In multi-state life insurance, an adequate balance between analytic tractability, computational efficiency, and statistical flexibility is of great importance. This might explain the popularity of Markov chain modelling, where matrix…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents…
We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the link between rising scale economies and stagnating productivity. Our model features heterogeneous firms, imperfect competition, and firm selection. We demonstrate that scale economies…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Analysis of multivariate data sets from e.g. microarray studies frequently results in lists of genes which are associated with some response of interest. The biological interpretation is often complicated by the statistical instability of…
Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs.…
We consider a fitness-structured population model with competition and migration between nearest neighbors. Under a combination of large population and rare migration limits we are particularly interested in the asymptotic behavior of the…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
Market-based coordination of demand side assets has gained great interests in recent years. In spite of its efficiency, there is a risk that the interaction between the dynamic assets through the price signal could result in an unstable…
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…