Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

In game theory and artificial intelligence, decision making models often involve maximizing expected utility, which does not respect ordinal invariance. In this paper, the author discusses the possibility of preserving ordinal invariance…

Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) uncertainty aversion plays a central role in decision theory and economics, yet many inconsistent behaviors have been observed in experiments. Motivated by this, we study an axiom postulating a minimal degree…

The paper presents an extension of Shannon fuzzy entropy for intuitionistic fuzzy one. Firstly, we presented a new formula for calculating the distance and similarity of intuitionistic fuzzy information. Then, we constructed measures for…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

We generalize the seminal framework of Kyle (1985) to a many-asset setting, bridging the gap between informed-trading theory and modern trading practices. Specifically, we formulate an infinite-dimensional Bayesian trading game in which the…

In the subjective Bayesian approach uncertainty is described by a prior distribution chosen by the statistician. Fuzzy set theory is another way of representing uncertainty. Here we give a decision theoretic approach which allows a Bayesian…

We consider a stochastic dynamic game where players have their own linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functions. Players are coupled through some environment variables, generated by another linear system driven by the states and…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

We consider capacity (fuzzy measure, non-additive probability) on a compactum as a monotone cooperative normed game. Then it is naturally to consider probability measures as elements of core of such game. We prove an analogue of…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…

This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a…

The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…

Dybvig (1988a,b) solves in a complete market setting the problem of finding a payoff that is cheapest possible in reaching a given target distribution ("cost-efficient payoff"). In the presence of ambiguity, the distribution of a payoff is,…

We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…

We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…

In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that…

Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…