Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff

This paper investigates the equilibrium portfolio selection for smooth ambiguity preferences in a continuous-time market. The investor is uncertain about the risky asset's drift term and updates the subjective belief according to the…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

In this paper we study the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing games introduced by Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We prove tighter lower and upper bounds of 7/6 and 4/3, respectively. This improves over the best known bounds…

In this paper, we study infinite-horizon linear-quadratic uncertain differential games with an output feedback information structure. We assume linear time-invariant nominal dynamics influenced by deterministic external disturbances, and…

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…

We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…

Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze…

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…

We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…

This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a necessary maximum principle and sufficient…

We consider discrete-time uncertain processes with finite state space and study the properties of game-theoretic upper expectations developed by Shafer and Vovk. We start by proving some basic properties, e.g. monotonicity, law of iterated…

In real-life temporal scenarios, uncertainty and preferences are often essential and coexisting aspects. We present a formalism where quantitative temporal constraints with both preferences and uncertainty can be defined. We show how three…

Let $T:X\to X $ and $S:Y \to Y$ be continuous maps defined on compact sets. Let $$\varphi_i(\mu,\nu)=\int_{X \times Y} A_i(x,y) d\mu(x) d\nu(y)\;\;{for} \;\; i=1,2,$$ where $\mu$ is $T$-invariant and $\nu$ is $S$-invariant, be pay-off…

Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…