Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff
We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…
This paper addresses the problem of utility maximization under uncertain parameters. In contrast with the classical approach, where the parameters of the model evolve freely within a given range, we constrain them via a penalty function. We…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…
We investigate a novel finite-horizon linear-quadratic (LQ) feedback dynamic potential game with a priori unknown cost matrices played between two players. The cost matrices are revealed to the players sequentially, with the potential for…
We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of…
Gallice and Monz\'on (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents…
The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is assumed that payments lead to transferable utility and that…
Realization of uncertainty of prices is captured by volatility, that is the tendency of prices to vary along a period of time. This is generally measured as standard deviation of daily returns. In this paper we propose and investigate the…
We consider a sequence of repeated interactions between an agent and an environment. Uncertainty about the environment is captured by a probability distribution over a space of hypotheses, which includes all computable functions. Given a…
In this paper, we study the egalitarian solution for games with discrete side payment, where the characteristic function is integer-valued and payoffs of players are integral vectors. The egalitarian solution, introduced by Dutta and Ray in…
Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…
A classical portfolio theory deals with finding the optimal proportion in which an agent invests a wealth in a risk-free asset and a probabilistic risky asset. Formulating and solving the problem depend on how the risk is represented and…
In this paper, we introduce an abstract fuzzy economy model with a measure space of agents which generalizes Patriche's model (2009), we obtain a theorem of fuzzy equilibrium existence and we prove the existence of the solutions for two…
We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…