Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff

This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are capacities. The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced J.Dow and S.Werlang (J Econ. Theory 64 (1994) 205--224) for two players…

This paper studies non-cooperative games where players are allowed to play their mixed non-additive strategies. Expected payoffs are expressed by so-called fuzzy integrals: Choquet integral, Sugeno integral and generalizations of Sugeno…

This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities. Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered by Kozhan and Zarichnyi (Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory {\bf 35} (2008) 321--331)…

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for qualitative decision under uncertainty in a finite setting. The corresponding utility is expressed by a sup-min expression, called Sugeno (or fuzzy) integral. Technically speaking, Sugeno…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

The expected utility hypothesis is a popular concept in economics that is useful for making decisions when the payoff is uncertain. In this paper, we investigate the implications of a fluctuation theorem in the theory of expected utility.…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We study binary coordination games with random utility played in networks. A typical equilibrium is fuzzy -- it has positive fractions of agents playing each action. The set of average behaviors that may arise in an equilibrium typically…

We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…

The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…

In this paper, we introduce an abstract fuzzy economy (generalized fuzzy game) model with a countable space of actions and we study the existence of the fuzzy equilibrium. As applications, two types of results are obtained. The first ones…

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

This paper introduces a framework for finite non-cooperative games where each player faces a globally uncertain parameter with no common prior. Every player chooses both a mixed strategy and projects an emergent subjective prior to the…

This paper focuses on a new model to reach the existence of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences (PXE-FP). The proposed model integrates exchange, consumption and the agent's fuzzy preference in the consumption set.…