Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

The aim of this research is to develop a reasoning under uncertainty strategy in the context of the Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning (FIR) methodology. FIR emerged from the General Systems Problem Solving developed by G. Klir. It is a data driven…

A new approach for uncertainty management for fuzzy, rule based decision support systems is proposed: The domain expert's knowledge is expressed by a set of rules that frequently refer to vague and uncertain propositions. The certainty of…

This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash…

We introduce the "relative diffuseness" assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

Traditional game theory assumes that the players in the game are aware of the rules of the game. However, in practice, often the players are unaware or have only partial knowledge about the game they are playing. They may also have…

This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…

A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…

We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…