Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups
Abstract
We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2303.10514,
title = {Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups},
author = {Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar and Jorge Bruno and Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.10514},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: Accepted Version and Title Change. text overlap with arXiv:2210.08328