Related papers: Kidney Exchange with Inhomogeneous Edge Existence …
A kidney exchange is a centrally-administered barter market where patients swap their willing yet incompatible donors. Modern kidney exchanges use 2-cycles, 3-cycles, and chains initiated by non-directed donors (altruists who are willing to…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) seeks to find possible exchanges among pairs of patients and their incompatible kidney donors while meeting specific optimization criteria such as maximizing the overall number of possible transplants.…
Algorithms for exchange of kidneys is one of the key successful applications in market design, artificial intelligence, and operations research. Potent immunosuppressant drugs suppress the body's ability to reject a transplanted organ up to…
In this paper we consider the Stochastic Matching problem, which is motivated by applications in kidney exchange and online dating. We are given an undirected graph in which every edge is assigned a probability of existence and a positive…
This paper presents a comprehensive review of the last two decades of research on Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), systematically categorizing and classifying key contributions to provide readers with a structured understanding of…
The seminal work of Roth, S\"onmez, & \"Unver shows that the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem for non-bipartite matching can be leveraged to yield a randomized algorithm to match patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange with extraordinarily…
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) form an innovative approach to increasing the donor pool through allowing the participation of renal patients together with a willing but incompatible donor. The aim of a KEP is to identify groups of…
We propose a way in which Kidney exchange can be feasibly, economically and efficiently implemented in Indian medical space, named as Indian Kidney Exchange Program(IKEP) along with Indian specific influence on compatibility and final…
Kidney exchange programs among hospitals in the United States and across European countries improve efficiency by pooling donors and patients on a centralized platform. Sustaining such cooperation requires stability. When the core is empty,…
We consider a well-studied online random graph model for kidney exchange, where nodes representing patient-donor pairs arrive over time, and the probability of a directed edge is p. We assume existence of a single altruistic donor, who…
Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph $G$ and integers $d$ and $k$, the standard problem asks whether $G$ contains a packing of…
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic algorithm for transplant exchange selection may have superior…
In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage renal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors among each other. National kidney exchange programmes are in operation in ten European countries, and some of…
The goal of a kidney exchange program (KEP) is to maximize number of transplants within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP can be modelled as a maximum matching problem in a graph. A KEP between…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is to find a constellation of exchanges that maximizes the number of transplants that can be carried out for a set of pairs of patients with kidney disease and their incompatible donors. Recently, this…
The kidney exchange mechanism allows many patient-donor pairs who are otherwise incompatible with each other to come together and exchange kidneys along a cycle. However, due to infrastructure and legal constraints, kidney exchange can only…
We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a…
We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents…