Related papers: Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characteri…

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…

In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the players have incomplete information…

Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we…

When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

We study repeated two-player games where one of the players, the learner, employs a no-regret learning strategy, while the other, the optimizer, is a rational utility maximizer. We consider general Bayesian games, where the payoffs of both…

In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…

Although the definition of what empathetic preferences exactly are is still evolving, there is a general consensus in the psychology, science and engineering communities that the evolution toward players' behaviors in interactive…

We extend the optimin notion of Ismail (2025) from mixed strategy profiles to correlated distributions. A correlated distribution is evaluated by the worst expected payoff each player can receive when opponents may either obey their private…

Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to…

Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of…

We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by…

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only…

Intuitively, experience playing against one mixture of opponents in a given domain should be relevant for a different mixture in the same domain. We propose a transfer learning method, Q-Mixing, that starts by learning Q-values against each…

In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…

The \$-Game was recently introduced as an extension of the Minority Game. In this paper we compare this model with the well know Minority Game and the Majority Game models. Due to the inter-temporal nature of the market payoff, we introduce…