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I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players endogenously decide whether to disclose signals about their past actions. I establish an-anti folk theorem, that when players are sufficiently long-lived, they will almost…
The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utility-maximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by altering the utility functions of agents to consider also…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…
Long-term cooperation, competition, or exploitation among individuals can be modeled through repeated games. In repeated games, Press and Dyson discovered zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a special relationship between two…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
We consider transformations of normal form games by binding preplay offers of players for payments of utility to other players conditional on them playing designated in the offers strategies. The game-theoretic effect of such preplay offers…
The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of…
The problem of two companies of agents with one-step memory playing game is investigated in the context of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under the partial imitation rule, where a player can imitate only those moves that he has observed in…
We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the "imitation of success". In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the…
This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may encounter an 'honest' type who always cooperates.…
For a set-valued function $F$ on a compact subset $W$ of a manifold, spanning is a topological property that implies that $F(x) \ne 0$ for interior points $x$ of $W$. A myopic equilibrium applies when for each action there is a payoff whose…
We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the…
Ethics play an important role in determining the behavior of an individual under certain circumstances. Ethical or unethical behavior can be treated as a strategy of a player in a pay-off game. In this paper, we present two analytical…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
We consider multi-dimensional payoff functions in partially observable Markov decision processes. We study the structure of the set of expected payoff vectors of all strategies (policies) and study what kind are needed to achieve a given…
In cooperative multiagent planning, it can often be beneficial for an agent to make commitments about aspects of its behavior to others, allowing them in turn to plan their own behaviors without taking the agent's detailed behavior into…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff regardless of the size of the minority group. Of great interest for real social and biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the…