Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship
Physics and Society
2015-08-26 v2 Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Abstract
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic. This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players' strategies, which we study both numerically and analytically.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1508.03529,
title = {Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship},
author = {Andrés Chacoma and Marcelo N. Kuperman and Damián H. Zanette},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.03529},
year = {2015}
}