Related papers: Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary vo…
Behavioural economics provides labels for patterns in human economic behaviour. Probability weighting is one such label. It expresses a mismatch between probabilities used in a formal model of a decision (i.e. model parameters) and…
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…
We consider a class of nonlocal games that are related to binary constraint systems (BCSs) in a manner similar to the games implicit in the work of Mermin [N.D. Mermin, "Simple unified form for the major no-hidden-variables theorems," Phys.…
We investigate systems of indirect voting based on the law of Penrose, in which each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes (voting weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents. For…
Despite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the…
The legal positions of a strong placement game, such as Domineering, form a simplicial complex called the legal complex. In this paper, we use the legal complex to study the game values taken on by the class of strong placement games using…
Real-world competitive games, such as chess, go, or StarCraft II, rely on Elo models to measure the strength of their players. Since these games are not fully transitive, using Elo implicitly assumes they have a strong transitive component…
The basic idea of voting protocols is that nodes query a sample of other nodes and adjust their own opinion throughout several rounds based on the proportion of the sampled opinions. In the classic model, it is assumed that all nodes have…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some examples with linear dimension and…
The notion of the voting power is illustrated by examples of the systems of voting in the European Council according to the Treaty of Nice and the more recent proposition of the European Convent. We show that both systems are not…
In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
One unexamined assumption in foreign ownership regulation is the notion that majority voting rights translate to 'effective control'. This assumption is so deeply entrenched in foreign investments law that possession of majority voting…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…
In many real world elections, agents are not required to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common methods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count),…
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
Quantitative measures of randomness in games are useful for game design and have implications for gambling law. We treat the outcome of a game as a random variable and derive a closed-form expression and estimator for the variance in the…