Related papers: Self-Excited Ising Game
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through…
Energy games are a well-studied class of 2-player turn-based games on a finite graph where transitions are labeled with integer vectors which represent changes in a multidimensional resource (the energy). One player tries to keep the…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
This paper studies a type of rank-based mean field game in which competing agents strategically switch among multiple effort regimes. We propose an entropy regularized auxiliary problem where the switching decisions are randomized to the…
This research investigates the impact of dynamic, time-varying interactions on cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. Traditional research has focused on deterministic rules governing pairwise interactions, yet the impact of interaction…
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
When a system's parameter is abruptly changed, a relaxation towards the new equilibrium of the system follows. We show that a crossing between the second and third eigenvalues of the relaxation matrix results in a relaxation trajectory…
We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The agent is privately informed about his type. The principal learns about the agent's type from a noisy performance measure, which can be manipulated by the agent via a…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
Recent studies in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games with reinforcement learning have shown that static agents can learn to cooperate through a diverse sort of mechanisms, including noise injection, different types of learning algorithms…
In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…
In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the…
In this paper, we show that two-dimensional billiards with point interactions inside exhibit a chaotic nature in the microscopic world, although their classical counterpart is non-chaotic. After deriving the transition matrix of the system…
Neuronal ensemble activity, including coordinated and oscillatory patterns, exhibits hallmarks of nonequilibrium systems with time-asymmetric trajectories to maintain their organization. However, assessing time asymmetry from neuronal…
Global games are a class of incomplete information games where the payoffs exhibit strategic complementarity leading to an incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions. Such games have been used to model scenarios in many…
We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into…
Evolutionary social dilemma games are extended by an additional matching-pennies game that modifies the collected payoffs. In a spatial version players are distributed on a square lattice and interact with their neighbors. Firstly, we show…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…