Related papers: Self-Excited Ising Game
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…
A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners' dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is…
This article is dedicated to the study of mixed zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games in the situation when the player's cost functionals are modeled by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic equations with two barriers…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of…
Commitment devices are powerful tools that can influence and incentivise certain behaviours by linking them to rewards or punishments. These devices are particularly useful in decision-making, as they can steer individuals towards specific…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria,…
We consider a finite-horizon, zero-sum game in which both players control a stochastic differential equation by invoking impulses. We derive a control randomization formulation of the game and use the existence of a value for the randomized…
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…
This article studies the kinetic dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors binary game. We first prove existence and uniqueness of the solution of the kinetic equation and subsequently we prove the rigorous derivation of the quasi-invariant limit…
We study a model of binary decisions in a fully connected network of interacting agents. Individual decisions are determined by social influence, coming from direct interactions with neighbours, and a group level pressure that accounts for…
An Ising model with local Glauber dynamics is studied under the influence of additional kinetic restrictions for the spin-flip rates depending on the orientation of neighboring spins. Even when the static interaction between the spins is…
Metastable brain dynamics are characterized by abrupt, jump-like modulations so that the neural activity in single trials appears to unfold as a sequence of discrete, quasi-stationary states. Evidence that cortical neural activity unfolds…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…
EBIs/ESOs substantially change the traditional production/service function because ESOs/EBIs can have different psychological effects(motivation or de-motivation), and can create intangible capital and different economic payoffs. Although…