Related papers: Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full …
Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous approaches that attempt to design revenue optimal auctions for the…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
We consider a discrete time financial market with proportional transaction costs under model uncertainty, and study a num\'eraire-based semi-static utility maximization problem with an exponential utility preference. The randomization…
Unfair pricing policies have been shown to be one of the most negative perceptions customers can have concerning pricing, and may result in long-term losses for a company. Despite the fact that dynamic pricing models help companies maximize…
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…
Price discrimination, which refers to the strategy of setting different prices for different customer groups, has been widely used in online retailing. Although it helps boost the collected revenue for online retailers, it might create…
We address fair sensor scheduling over bandwidth-constrained communication channels. While existing literature on fair scheduling overlooks overall system efficiency, we introduce a novel $q$-fairness framework to balance efficiency and…
The classical theory of efficient allocations of an aggregate endowment in a pure-exchange economy has hitherto primarily focused on the Pareto-efficiency of allocations, under the implicit assumption that transfers between agents are…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
We construct an utility-based dynamic asset pricing model for a limit order market. The price is nonlinear in volume and subject to market impact. We solve an optimal hedging problem under the market impact and derive the dynamics of the…
Optimization models generally aim for efficiency by maximizing total benefit or minimizing cost. Yet a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is an important element of many practical decisions. We propose a principled and practical…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
Probabilistic forecasting in combination with stochastic programming is a key tool for handling the growing uncertainties in future energy systems. Derived from a general stochastic programming formulation for the optimal scheduling and…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
We introduce balancedness a fairness axiom in house allocation problems. It requires a mechanism to assign the top choice, the second top choice, and so on, on the same number of profiles for each agent. This axiom guarantees equal…
We consider a fixed-price mechanism design setting where a seller sells one item via a social network, but the seller can only directly communicate with her neighbours initially. Each other node in the network is a potential buyer with a…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…