Related papers: Dynamic information design
Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…
Demand-side management (DSM) enables distribution system operators (DSOs) to steer electricity consumption through dynamic price signals or incentive mechanisms, thereby leveraging end-users' flexibility potential for delivering grid…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…
This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…
In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets and single-bit transmission where a transmitter has a pair of messages, one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed, whereas the other message…
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…
One of the reasons why stochastic dynamic games with an underlying dynamic system are challenging is since strategic players have access to enormous amount of information which leads to the use of extremely complex strategies at…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
This paper is concerned with a three-level stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, in which three players participate credited as Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. Player 3 acts as the leader of…
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value. The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses…
This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…