Related papers: Dynamic information design
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…
We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that…
Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems,…
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents…
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver faces a sequential decision making (SDM) problem. At each…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
This paper studies a three party energy management problem in a user interactive smart community that consists of a large number of residential units (RUs) with distributed energy resources (DERs), a shared facility controller (SFC) and the…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…
We study a dynamic traffic assignment model, where agents base their instantaneous routing decisions on real-time delay predictions. We formulate a mathematically concise model and define dynamic prediction equilibrium (DPE) in which no…
We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct a thorough analysis of the existence,…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…