Related papers: Framing Effects on Strategic Information Design un…

Recommendation systems are pervasive in the digital economy. An important assumption in many deployed systems is that user consumption reflects user preferences in a static sense: users consume the content they like with no other…

It is widely believed that one's peers influence product adoption behaviors. This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold when the…

We study the state-dependent wiretap channel with non-causal channel state informations at the encoder in an integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) scenario. In this scenario, the transmitter communicates a message and a state…

Public acceptance of industrial human-robot collaboration (HRC) is shaped by how risks and benefits are perceived by affected employees. Positive or negative media framing may shape and shift how individuals evaluate HRC. This study…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

We consider the problem of estimation from survey data gathered from strategic and boundedly-rational agents with heterogeneous objectives and available information. Particularly, we consider a setting where there are three different types…

Sensing privacy and communication confidentiality play fundamentally different but interconnected roles in adversarial wireless environments. Capturing this interplay within a single physical-layer framework is particularly challenging in…

We introduce deceptive signaling framework as a new defense measure against advanced adversaries in cyber-physical systems. In general, adversaries look for system-related information, e.g., the underlying state of the system, in order to…

Randomized experiments are a powerful methodology for data-driven evaluation of decisions or interventions. Yet, their validity may be undermined by network interference. This occurs when the treatment of one unit impacts not only its…

Standard information theory says nothing about how much meaning is conveyed by a message. We fill this gap with a rigorously justifiable, quantitative definition of ``pragmatic information'', the amount of meaning in a message relevant to a…

In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…

This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…

In many real-world strategic settings, people use information displays to make decisions. In these settings, an information provider chooses which information to provide to strategic agents and how to present it, and agents formulate a best…

We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver…

This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we…

This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…

We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We…