Related papers: Framing Effects on Strategic Information Design un…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…

Information sharing on social networks is ubiquitous, intuitive, and occasionally accidental. However, people may be unaware of the potential negative consequences of disclosures, such as reputational damages. Yet, people use social…

During an epidemic, the information available to individuals in the society deeply influences their belief of the epidemic spread, and consequently the preventive measures they take to stay safe from the infection. In this paper, we develop…

Bayesian persuasion studies the problem faced by an informed sender who strategically discloses information to influence the behavior of an uninformed receiver. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings where the sender and…

In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quantum indeterminacy of a decision-maker's beliefs, a feature that has been proposed as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a…

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of…

Risk measures are commonly used to capture the risk preferences of decision-makers (DMs). The decisions of DMs can be nudged or manipulated when their risk preferences are influenced by factors such as the availability of information about…

We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…

In this paper, we expand the Bayesian persuasion framework to account for unobserved confounding variables in sender-receiver interactions. While traditional models assume that belief updates follow Bayesian principles, real-world scenarios…

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

This systematic literature review seeks to explain the mechanisms and implications of information disorder for public policy and the democratic process, by proposing a five-stage framework capturing its full life cycle. To our knowledge, no…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…

We consider the disclosure problem of a sender with a large data set of hard evidence who wants to persuade a receiver to take higher actions. Because the receiver will make inferences based on the distribution of the data they see, the…

In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender's objective…

We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…