Related papers: A Phase Transition in Arrow's Theorem
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
Incomputability results in Formal Logic and the Theory of Computation (i.e., incompleteness and undecidability) have deep implications for the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Likewise, Social Choice Theory, a branch of…
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of…
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
Voting is an important social activity for expressing public opinions. By conceptually considering a group of voting agents to be intelligent matter, the impact of real-time information on voting results is quantitatively studied by an…
This work introduces a model in which agents of a network act upon one another according to three different kinds of moral decisions. These decisions are based on an increasing level of sophistication in the empathy capacity of the agent, a…
In this article, we propose to use the formalism of quantum mechanics to describe and explain the so-called "abnormal" behaviour of agents in certain decision or choice contexts. The basic idea is to postulate that the preferences of these…
In the coevolving voter model, each voter has one of two diametrically opposite opinions, and a voter encountering a neighbor with the opposite opinion may either adopt it or rewire the connection to another randomly chosen voter sharing…
Instant runoff voting (IRV) has recently gained popularity as an alternative to plurality voting for political elections, with advocates claiming a range of advantages, including that it produces more moderate winners than plurality and…
Transitive proxy voting (or "liquid democracy") is a novel form of collective decision making, often framed as an attractive hybrid of direct and representative democracy. Although the ideas behind liquid democracy have garnered widespread…
Consider a community where initially, each individual is positive or negative regarding a reform proposal. In each round, individuals gather randomly in fixed rooms of different sizes, and all individuals in a room agree on the majority…
We generalize the Arrow's impossibility theorem--a key result in social choice theory--to the setting where the arity $k$ of the relation under consideration is greater than $2$. Some special but natural properties of $k$-ary relations are…
Measurement-induced phase transitions (MIPTs) in monitored quantum systems are typically diagnosed using entanglement-based measures. Here, we develop a complementary thermodynamic perspective based on the arrow of time (AoT), which arises…
We investigate the role of opinion leaders or influentials in the collective behavior of a social system. Opinion leaders are characterized by their unidirectional influence on other agents. We employ a model based on Axelrod's dynamics for…
We generalize the original majority-vote model by incorporating an inertia into the microscopic dynamics of the spin flipping, where the spin-flip probability of any individual depends not only on the states of its neighbors, but also on…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
Revised proofs of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem have been presented in prose form, incorporating novel ideas such as decisive sets and pivotal voters. This study develops another approach to proving the theorem. Using a proof…
We consider the social welfare function a la Arrow, where some voters are not qualified to evaluate some alternatives. Thus, the inputs of the social welfare function are the preferences of voters on the alternatives that they are qualified…