Related papers: A Phase Transition in Arrow's Theorem
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. However, we prove that certain types of quarrel…
Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes challenge the assumption that events are absolute -- that when we measure a system, we obtain a single result, which is not relative to anything or anyone else. These paradoxes highlight the tension between…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
The rebellious voter model, introduced by Sturm and Swart (2008), is a variation of the standard, one-dimensional voter model, in which types that are locally in the minority have an advantage. It is related, both through duality and…
Recently, it was shown that there is a phase transition in the community detection problem. This transition was first computed using the cavity method, and has been proved rigorously in the case of $q=2$ groups. However, analytic…
Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting…
Heterogeneous adoption thresholds exist widely in social contagions, but were always neglected in previous studies. We first propose a non-Markovian spreading threshold model with general adoption threshold distribution. In order to…
We investigate how the choice of decision makers can be varied under the presence of risk and uncertainty. Our analysis is based on the approach we have previously applied to individual decision makers, which we now generalize to the case…
We study the problem of {\em impartial selection}, a topic that lies at the intersection of computational social choice and mechanism design. The goal is to select the most popular individual among a set of community members. The input can…
A random walk in $Z_+^2$ spatially homogeneous in the interior, absorbed at the axes, starting from an arbitrary point $(i_0,j_0)$ and with step probabilities drawn on Figure 1 is considered. The trivariate generating function of…
In a physical system, changing parameters such as temperature can induce a phase transition: an abrupt change from one state of matter to another. Analogous phenomena have recently been observed in large language models. Typically, the task…
We present some conditions for social preference transitivity under the majority rule when the individual preferences include cycles. First, our concern is with the restriction on the preference orderings of individuals except those (called…
The moral foundations theory supports that people, across cultures, tend to consider a small number of dimensions when classifying issues on a moral basis. The data also show that the statistics of weights attributed to each moral dimension…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
The Fluctuation Theorem describes the probability ratio of observing trajectories that satisfy or violate the second law of thermodynamics. It has been proved in a number of different ways for thermostatted deterministic nonequilibrium…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the…
A canonical problem in social choice is how to aggregate ranked votes: given $n$ voters' rankings over $m$ candidates, what voting rule $f$ should we use to aggregate these votes into a single winner? One standard method for comparing…
In the standard $q$-voter model, a given agent can change its opinion only if there is a full consensus of the opposite opinion within a group of influence of size $q$. A more realistic extension is the threshold $q$-voter, where a minimal…
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting,…