Related papers: Games in Minkowski Spacetime
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…
Schmidt's game is a powerful tool for studying properties of certain sets which arise in Diophantine approximation theory, number theory, and dynamics. Recently, many new results have been proven using this game. In this paper we address…
We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of…
Games, in their mathematical sense, are everywhere (game industries, economics, defense, education, chemistry, biology, ...).Search algorithms in games are artificial intelligence methods for playing such games. Unfortunately, there is no…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In these games players proceed in turns having, at each stage, finitely many moves to their disposal, each play always ends, and in each play the…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…
Imperfect recall games represent dynamic interactions where players forget previously known information, such as a history of played actions. The importance of imperfect recall games stems from allowing a concise representation of…
Recently the concept of quantum information has been introduced into game theory. Here we present the first study of quantum games with more than two players. We discover that such games can possess a new form of equilibrium strategy, one…
We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…