Related papers: Games in Minkowski Spacetime

In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the…

Reactive synthesis is a class of methods to construct a provably-correct control system, referred to as a robot, with respect to a temporal logic specification in the presence of a dynamic and uncontrollable environment. This is achieved by…

This paper uses value functions to characterize the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of an arbitrary, possibly infinite-horizon game. It specifies the game's extensive form as a pentaform (Streufert 2023p, arXiv:2107.10801v4), which…

Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…

Quantum phenomena have remained largely inaccessible to the general public. This can be attributed to the fact that we do not experience quantum mechanics on a tangible level in our daily lives. Games can provide an environment in which…

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…

Moves in chess games are usually analyzed on a case-by-case basis by professional players, but thanks to the availability of large game databases, we can envision another approach of the game. Here, we indeed adopt a very different point of…

This article introduces differential hybrid games, which combine differential games with hybrid games. In both kinds of games, two players interact with continuous dynamics. The difference is that hybrid games also provide all the features…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves…

We derive multiparty games that, if the winning chance exceeds a certain limit, prove the incompatibility of the parties' causal relations with any partial order. This, in turn, means that the parties exert a back-action on the causal…

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…

In Minkowski spacetime, we consider an isolated system made of two pointlike bodies interacting at a distance, in the nonradiative approximation. Our framework is the covariant and a priori Hamiltonian formalism of "predictive relativistic…

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

We study stochastic differential games of jump diffusions, where the players have access to inside information. Our approach is based on anticipative stochastic calculus, white noise, Hida-Malliavin calculus, forward integrals and the…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some…