Related papers: Hardware Trojan with Frequency Modulation

Hardware Trojans (HT s) are a persistent threat to integrated circuits, especially when inserted at the register-transfer level (RTL). Existing methods typically first convert the design into a graph, such as a gate-level netlist or an…

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are known for their reprogrammability that allows for post-manufacture circuitry changes. Nowadays, they are integral to a variety of systems including high-security applications such as aerospace and…

Register Files (RFs) are the most frequently accessed memories in a microprocessor for fast and efficient computation and control logic. Segment registers and control registers are especially critical for maintaining the CPU mode of…

The growing use of third-party hardware accelerators (e.g., FPGAs, ASICs) for deep neural networks (DNNs) introduces new security vulnerabilities. Conventional model-level backdoor attacks, which only poison a model's weights to misclassify…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…

Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a…

Deep Neural Networks are vulnerable to Trojan (or backdoor) attacks. Reverse-engineering methods can reconstruct the trigger and thus identify affected models. Existing reverse-engineering methods only consider input space constraints,…

A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce…

Due to the globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, hardware trojans and the attacks that can trigger them have become an important security issue. One type of hardware Trojans leverages the don't care transitions in Finite…

The global semiconductor supply chain involves design and fabrication at various locations, which leads to multiple security vulnerabilities, e.g., Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Although most HTs target digital circuits, HTs can be…

Recently, Haider et al. introduced the first rigorous hardware Trojan detection algorithm called HaTCh. The foundation of HaTCh is a formal framework of hardware Trojan design, which formally characterizes all the hardware Trojans based on…

The outsourced manufacturing of integrated circuits has increased the risk of intellectual property theft. In response, logic locking techniques have been developed for protecting designs by adding programmable elements to the circuit.…

Side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic devices. They use only quantities observable from outside, such as the duration and the power consumption. Attacks against synchronous devices using electric observations are…

Digital Manufacturing (DM) refers to the on-going adoption of smarter, more agile manufacturing processes and cyber-physical systems. This includes modern techniques and technologies such as Additive Manufacturing (AM)/3D printing, as well…

Timely detection of Hardware Trojans (HTs) has become a major challenge for secure integrated circuits. We present a run-time methodology for HT detection that employs a multi-parameter statistical traffic modeling of the communication…

Integrated circuits (ICs) are the foundation of all computing systems. They comprise high-value hardware intellectual property (IP) that are at risk of piracy, reverse-engineering, and modifications while making their way through the…

Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…

This paper proposes MergeGuard, a novel methodology for mitigation of AI Trojan attacks. Trojan attacks on AI models cause inputs embedded with triggers to be misclassified to an adversary's target class, posing a significant threat to…

Always-on hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis…

A recent trojan attack on deep neural network (DNN) models is one insidious variant of data poisoning attacks. Trojan attacks exploit an effective backdoor created in a DNN model by leveraging the difficulty in interpretability of the…