Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.
@article{arxiv.2102.00724,
title = {Side-Channel Trojan Insertion -- a Practical Foundry-Side Attack via ECO},
author = {Tiago Perez and Malik Imran and Pablo Vaz and Samuel Pagliarini},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.00724},
year = {2021}
}