Related papers: Computing the proportional veto core
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called Plurality Matching. The rule picks an arbitrary candidate…
The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
We study the problem of selecting a statement that finds common ground across diverse population preferences. Generative AI is uniquely suited for this task because it can access a practically infinite set of statements, but AI systems like…
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all…
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates $C$ and voters $V$ in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of distances of the selected candidate from all the voters, and…
Sortition is based on the idea of choosing randomly selected representatives for decision making. The main properties that make sortition particularly appealing are fairness -- all the citizens can be selected with the same probability --…
Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to $k$ candidates from a set of $m$ candidates based on the preferences of $n$ voters, each of whom approves a subset of the candidates. A central open…
Consider the decision-making setting where agents elect a panel by expressing both positive and negative preferences. Prominently, in constitutional AI, citizens democratically select a slate of ethical preferences on which a foundation…
We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
Voting algorithms have been widely used as consensus protocols in the realization of fault-tolerant systems. These algorithms are best suited for distributed systems of nodes with low computational power or heterogeneous networks, where…
Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…
An energy community is modeled as a cooperative game, where a veto player is needed beyond the prosumers to manage the community, and the worth of a coalition is its benefit compared to the selfish behaviour of the prosumers. Properties of…
In the context of single-winner ranked-choice elections between $m$ candidates, we explore the tradeoff between two competing goals in every democratic system: the majority principle (maximizing the social welfare) and the minority…
The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has appeared in the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepresentation of minorities. However, we…