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State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate…
This paper presents a hybrid data-driven physics model-based framework for real time monitoring in smart grids. As the power grid transitions to the use of smart grid technology, it's real time monitoring becomes more vulnerable to cyber…
In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a significant threat to modern power systems. Although numerous research studies have focused on FDI attacks on power systems, these studies have primarily concentrated on designing or detecting DC FDI…
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against powersystem state estimation are a growing concern for operators.Previously, most works on FDI attacks have been performedunder the assumption of the attacker having full knowledge ofthe underlying…
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…
In the recent years cyberattacks to smart grids are becoming more frequent Among the many malicious activities that can be launched against smart grids False Data Injection FDI attacks have raised significant concerns from both academia and…
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…
Physical security of power networks under power injection attacks that alter generation and loads is studied. The system operator employs Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) for detecting such attacks, while attackers devise attacks that are…
The rapid growth of AI-driven data centers and large-scale energy storage systems is increasing the reliance of power system operation on real-time measurement data and automated decision-making. However, many existing detection methods…
As one of the largest and most complex systems on earth, power grid (PG) operation and control have stepped forward as a compound analysis on both physical and cyber layers which makes it vulnerable to assaults from economic and security…
This paper presents a new framework of identifying a series of cyber data attacks on power system synchrophasor measurements. We focus on detecting "unobservable" cyber data attacks that cannot be detected by any existing method that purely…
The false data injection (FDI) attack is a crucial form of cyber-physical security problems facing cyber-physical power systems. However, there is no research revealing the problem of FDI attacks facing voltage source converter based high…
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks pose significant threats by manipulating measurement data, leading to incorrect state estimation. Although numerous studies have focused on designing DC FDI attacks, few have addressed AC FDI attacks due…
In this paper, we examine the factors that influence the success of false data injection (FDI) attacks in the context of both cyber and physical styles of reinforcement. Many works consider the FDI attack in the context of the ability to…
Cyber-physical system (CPS) is the foundational backbone of modern critical infrastructures, so ensuring its security and resilience against cyber-attacks is of pivotal importance. This paper addresses the challenge of designing anomaly…
Recent studies have considered thwarting false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in power grids by proactively perturbing branch susceptances. This approach is known as moving target defense (MTD). However, despite of…
State estimation estimates the system condition in real-time and provides a base case for other energy management system (EMS) applications including real-time contingency analysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Recent work in…
Understanding smart grid cyber attacks is key for developing appropriate protection and recovery measures. Advanced attacks pursue maximized impact at minimized costs and detectability. This paper conducts risk analysis of combined data…