This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming to maximize the physical power flow on a target line. Understanding the consequences of these attacks requires consideration of power system operations commonly used in practice, specifically real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). An ADBLP is formulated with detailed assumptions on attacker's knowledge, and a modified Benders' decomposition algorithm is introduced to solve such an ADBLP. The vulnerability analysis results presented for the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that intelligent FDI attacks can cause post-contingency overflows.
@article{arxiv.1903.07781,
title = {Vulnerability Assessment of N-1 Reliable Power Systems to False Data Injection Attacks},
author = {Zhigang Chu and Jiazi Zhang and Oliver Kosut and Lalitha Sankar},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.07781},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
8 pages, 5 figures, 1 table. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1705.04218