False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against powersystem state estimation are a growing concern for operators.Previously, most works on FDI attacks have been performedunder the assumption of the attacker having full knowledge ofthe underlying system without clear justification. In this paper, wedevelop a topology-learning-aided FDI attack that allows stealthycyber-attacks against AC power system state estimation withoutprior knowledge of system information. The attack combinestopology learning technique, based only on branch and bus powerflows, and attacker-side pseudo-residual assessment to performstealthy FDI attacks with high confidence. This paper, for thefirst time, demonstrates how quickly the attacker can developfull-knowledge of the grid topology and parameters and validatesthe full knowledge assumptions in the previous work.
@article{arxiv.2102.12248,
title = {Topology Learning Aided False Data Injection Attack without Prior Topology Information},
author = {Martin Higgins and Jiawei Zhang and Ning Zhang and Fei Teng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.12248},
year = {2021}
}