Related papers: On beta-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the $\mathcal{R}$-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed election under the voting rule…
Given a target set $A\subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ and a real number $\beta\in (0,1)$, McMullen introduced the notion of $A$ being an absolutely $\beta$-winning set. This involves a two player game which we call the $\beta$-McMullen game. We…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule for $z$ candidates such that in each vote, the first candidate receives $z-1$ points, the second $z-2$ points and so on. The winner in the Borda rule is the candidate with highest total…
The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the…
We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which…
Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a…
The voter process is a classic stochastic process that models the invasion of a mutant trait $A$ (e.g., a new opinion, belief, legend, genetic mutation, magnetic spin) in a population of agents (e.g., people, genes, particles) who share a…
Consider the decision-making setting where agents elect a panel by expressing both positive and negative preferences. Prominently, in constitutional AI, citizens democratically select a slate of ethical preferences on which a foundation…
We introduce the vacillating voter model in which each voter consults two neighbors to decide its state, and changes opinion if it disagrees with either neighbor. This irresolution leads to a global bias toward zero magnetization. In…
Given a transition matrix $P$ indexed by a finite set $V$ of vertices, the voter model is a discrete-time Markov chain in $\{0,1\}^V$ where at each time-step a randomly chosen vertex $x$ imitates the opinion of vertex $y$ with probability…
We conjecture that Borda count is the ranked choice voting method that best preserves the outcome of an election with randomly corrupted votes, among all fair voting methods with small influences satisfying the Condorcet Loser Criterion.…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
Motivated by the problem of filtering candidate pairs in inner product similarity joins we study the following inner product estimation problem: Given parameters $d\in {\bf N}$, $\alpha>\beta\geq 0$ and unit vectors $x,y\in {\bf R}^{d}$…
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a process in which voters decide how to allocate a common budget; most commonly it is done by ordinary people -- in particular, residents of some municipality -- to decide on a fraction of the municipal…
We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the…
In a district-based election, we apply a voting rule $r$ to decide the winners in each district, and a candidate who wins in a maximum number of districts is the winner of the election. We present efficient sampling-based algorithms to…
Let $v(n)$ be the minimum number of voters with transitive preferences which are needed to generate any strong preference pattern (ties not allowed) on $n$ candidates. Let $k=\lfloor \log_2 n\rfloor$. We show that $v(n)\le n-k$ if $n$ and…
Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in computational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some amount of money depending on what…