Related papers: The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable …
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
Effective learning of user preferences is critical to easing user burden in various types of matching problems. Equally important is active query selection to further reduce the amount of preference information users must provide. We…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…