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Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…