Related papers: The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social …
If uncertainty is modelled by a probability measure, decisions are typically made by choosing the option with the highest expected utility. If an imprecise probability model is used instead, this decision rule can be generalised in several…
Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of…
It is useful to have a criterion for when the predictions of an operational theory should be considered classically explainable. Here we take the criterion to be that the theory admits of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model.…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Given the family $P$ of all nonempty subsets of a set $U$ of alternatives, a choice over $U$ is a function $c \colon \Omega \to P$ such that $\Omega \subseteq P$ and $c(B) \subseteq B$ for all menus $B \in \Omega$. A choice is total if…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
The long-standing unitary-actor assumption in strategy research -- treating firms as monolithic entities with coherent preferences -- misses that organizations are coalitions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting goals. Although…
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All…
The {\it profile} of a relational structure $R$ is the function $\phi_R$ which counts for every integer $n$ the number of its $n$-element substructures up to an isomorphism. Many counting functions are profiles. Interesting examples come…
Social choice theory offers a wealth of approaches for selecting a candidate on behalf of voters based on their reported preference rankings over options. When voters have underlying utilities for these options, however, using preference…
An indicator for presence of community structure in networks is suggested. It allows one to check whether such structures can exist, in principle, in any particular network, without a need to apply computationally cost algorithms. In this…
We say that a formal power series $\sum a_n z^n$ with rational coefficients is a 2-function if the numerator of the fraction $a_{n/p}-p^2 a_n$ is divisible by $p^2$ for every prime number $p$. One can prove that 2-functions with rational…
A central theme in social choice theory is that of impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to…
We introduce the logic LRC, designed to describe and reason about agents' abilities and capabilities in using resources. The proposed framework bridges two - up to now - mutually independent strands of literature: the one on logics of…
Consider complex semisimple Lie algebras of a given dimension specified by their structure constants. We describe a finite collection of rational functions in the structure constants that form a complete set of invariants: two sets of…
Richard Cox [1] set the axiomatic foundations of probable inference and the algebra of propositions. He showed that consistency within these axioms requires certain rules for updating belief. In this paper we use the analogy between…
In most contemporary approaches to decision making, a decision problem is described by a sets of states and set of outcomes, and a rich set of acts, which are functions from states to outcomes over which the decision maker (DM) has…