Related papers: The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social …
We combine several folklore observations to provide a working framework for iterating constructions which contradict the axiom of choice. We use this to define a model in which any kind of structural failure must fail with a proper class of…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
In this paper, we take a statistical decision-theoretic viewpoint on social choice, putting a focus on the decision to be made on behalf of a system of agents. In our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space,…
The main problem we address in this paper is whether function determines form when a society of agents organizes itself for some purpose or whether the organizing method is more important than the functionality in determining the structure…
Deterrence coalitions that collectively own their deterrence technology, need an institutional design to decide when to retaliate against an attack or incident. This choice of institutional design, formalized through a social choice…
Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science.…
In this paper we establish a general framework in which the verification of support theorems for generalized convex functions acting between an algebraic structure and an ordered algebraic structure is still possible. As for the domain…
We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of…
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' types. To do so, the designer constructs a mechanism which describes…
The paper deals with partial and weak preference relations defined on infinite-dimensional vector spaces and compatible with algebraic operations. By a partial preference we mean an asymmetric and transitive binary relation, while a weak…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former…
We investigate the phenomenon of diffusion in a countably infinite society of individuals interacting with their neighbors in a network. At a given time, each individual is either active or inactive. The diffusion is driven by two…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
Fairness problems in recommender systems often have a complexity in practice that is not adequately captured in simplified research formulations. A social choice formulation of the fairness problem, operating within a multi-agent…
Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice…
We study the expressive power of the two-variable fragment of order-invariant first-order logic. This logic departs from first-order logic in two ways: first, formulas are only allowed to quantify over two variables. Second, formulas can…
We focus on the strategyproofness of voting systems where voters must choose a number of options among several possibilities. These systems include those that are used for Participatory Budgeting, where we organize an election to determine…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…