Related papers: Strategic information transmission with sender's a…

We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…

Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision…

We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…

In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…

We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…

We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…

I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power…

We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a…

An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…