Related papers: How Good Is a Two-Party Election Game?
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
Many democratic societies use district-based elections, where the region under consideration is geographically divided into districts and a representative is chosen for each district based on the preferences of the electors who reside…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…
The probability of a given candidate winning a future election is worked out in closed form as a function of (i) the current support rates for each candidate, (ii) the relative positioning of the candidates within the political spectrum,…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. From the viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each election has…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
Here we present \texttt{electoral\_sim}, an open-source Python framework for simulating and comparing electoral systems across diverse voter preference distributions. The framework represents voters and candidates as points in a…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…
We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in…
We investigate a two-stage competitive model involving multiple contests. In this model, each contest designer chooses two participants from a pool of candidate contestants and determines the biases. Contestants strategically distribute…
When each voter rates or ranks several candidates for a single office, a strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is one who beats all others in two-way races. Among 21 electoral systems examined, 18 will sometimes make candidate X the winner even if…