Related papers: How Good Is a Two-Party Election Game?
This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
Within the framework of Game Theory, contests study decision-making in those situations or conflicts when rewards depend on the relative rank between contenders rather than their absolute performance. By relying on the formalism of Tullock…
Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…
Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…
This paper investigates a two-stage game-theoretical model with multiple parallel rank-order contests. In this model, each contest designer sets up a contest and determines the prize structure within a fixed budget in the first stage.…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…
In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…
This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the outcome set is at least twice as large as the player set. A…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…