Related papers: Manipulating Elections by Selecting Issues
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…
Complex dynamical systems driven by the unravelling of information can be modelled effectively by treating the underlying flow of information as the model input. Complicated dynamical behaviour of the system is then derived as an output.…
We construct a model of expert prediction where predictions can influence the state of the world. Under this model, we show through theoretical and numerical results that proper scoring rules can incentivize experts to manipulate the world…
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. We study the complexity of manipulation, constructive control by deleting voters (CCDV), and bribery for scoring systems. For manipulation, we show that for all scoring…
Determining the complexity of election attack problems is a major research direction in the computational study of voting problems. The paper "Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting…
We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting…
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the…
This work presents a framework for control theory based on constructive analysis to account for discrepancy between mathematical results and their implementation in a computer, also referred to as computational uncertainty. In control…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
This study investigates adversarial attacks conducted to distort voter model dynamics in complex networks. Specifically, a simple adversarial attack method is proposed to hold the state of opinions of an individual closer to the target…
We investigate constrained optimal control problems for linear stochastic dynamical systems evolving in discrete time. We consider minimization of an expected value cost over a finite horizon. Hard constraints are introduced first, and then…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
We study how office-seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind,…
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent…