Related papers: Finite-Time 4-Expert Prediction Problem
This work addresses a classic problem of online prediction with expert advice. We assume an adversarial opponent, and we consider both the finite-horizon and random-stopping versions of this zero-sum, two-person game. Focusing on an…
This work addresses the classic machine learning problem of online prediction with expert advice. We consider the finite-horizon version of this zero-sum, two-person game. Using verification arguments from optimal control theory, we view…
This work investigates the online machine learning problem of prediction with expert advice in an adversarial setting through numerical analysis of, and experiments with, a related partial differential equation. The problem is a repeated…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
We study the problem of nonstochastic bandits with expert advice, extending the setting from finitely many experts to any countably infinite set: A learner aims to maximize the total reward by taking actions sequentially based on bandit…
In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…
Prediction with experts' advice is one of the most fundamental problems in online learning and captures many of its technical challenges. A recent line of work has looked at online learning through the lens of differential equations and…
We study how we can adapt a predictor to a non-stationary environment with advises from multiple experts. We study the problem under complete feedback when the best expert changes over time from a decision theoretic point of view. Proposed…
For the problem of prediction with expert advice in the adversarial setting with geometric stopping, we compute the exact leading order expansion for the long time behavior of the value function. Then, we use this expansion to prove that as…
This work addresses the classic machine learning problem of online prediction with expert advice. A new potential-based framework for the fixed horizon version of this problem has been recently developed using verification arguments from…
We argue that the existing regret matchings for Nash equilibrium approximation conduct "jumpy" strategy updating when the probabilities of future plays are set to be proportional to positive regret measures. We propose a geometrical regret…
In this letter, we study a model-based inverse problem for infinite-horizon linear-quadratic differential games with descriptor dynamics. Given an observed feedback strategy profile, we seek to identify all cost functions that rationalize…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…
This paper develops a predictive compensation framework for finite-horizon, discrete-time linear quadratic dynamic games subject to Gauss-Markov execution deviations from feedback Nash strategies. One player's control is corrupted by…
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…
In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…